Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies
AbstractIn economies with public goods, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic selections from the set of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations. Such selections exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. This requirement is very restrictive in the context oC more than one public good. However, whenever it holds any such mechanism must choose an egalitarian equivalent allocation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 1996-12.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Public goods; technological monotonicity; egalitarian equivalent allocations;
Other versions of this item:
- M. GinÊs & F. Marhuenda, 1998. "Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 423-432.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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- Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
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