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Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation

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  • Marc Fleurbaey

    ()
    (THEMA, UniversitÊ de Cergy-Pontoise, F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France)

  • Francois Maniquet

    ()
    (FNRS and FUNDP, B-5000 Namur, Belgium)

Abstract

We consider a simple production model and we assume that agents have unequal production skills which can in no way be attributed to their responsibility. We study how it is possible, if at all, to compensate for differential skills by applying Rawls's idea of a collective sharing in the benefits of skills. For this purpose, we introduce an axiom of solidarity, according to which agents should all be affected in the same direction if the profile of personal skills changes. We show that particular allocation rules are characterized be combining this axiom with a requirement of non-discrimination among preferences, or with a property capturing Nozick's idea of guaranteeing a minimal benefit from one's own skill.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 569-583

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:569-583

Note: Received: 1 July 1996/Accepted: 25 May 1998
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Cited by:
  1. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., . "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1896, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00179979 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Alice Becker, 2013. "Accountability and the fairness bias: the effects of effort vs. luck," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 685-699, September.
  4. Yengin Duygu, 2012. "Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-35, April.
  5. Cato, Susumu, 2010. "Local strict envy-freeness in large economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 319-322, May.
  6. Efthymios Athanasiou, 2012. "Endogenous productivity and equality of opportunity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 59-89, June.
  7. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
  8. Justin Leroux, 2006. "A discussion of the consistency axiom in cost-allocation problems," Cahiers de recherche 06-13, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  9. Juan Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2004. "Impartiality and Priority. Part 2: A Characterization with Solidarity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1477B, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2005.
  10. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004. "Rewarding effort," Memorandum 15/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  11. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00179979 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004. "The liberal egalitarian paradox," Memorandum 14/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  13. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 253-272, November.
  14. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00151509 is not listed on IDEAS

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