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Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences

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  • Koichi Tadenuma

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Abstract

When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable whereas y is not. The equity-first principle reverses the order of application of the two criteria. Adopting egalitarian-equivalence as the notion of equity, we examine rationality of the social preference functions based on the efficiency-first or the equity-first principle. The degrees of rationality vary widely depending on which principle is adopted, and depending on the range of egalitarian-reference bundles. We show several impossibility and possibility results as well as a characterization of the social preference function introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). We also identify the sets of maximal allocations of the social preference relations in an Edgeworth box. The results are contrasted with those in the case where no-envy is the notion of equity.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-003-0310-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 455-473

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:3:p:455-473

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Cited by:
  1. Houy, Nicolas & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2009. "Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1770-1782, July.
  2. Marc Fleurbaey, 2004. "Two Criteria for Social Decisions," Economics Papers 2004-W27, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  3. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2008. "Fair Collective Choice Rules: Their Origin and Relationship," Working Papers 1179, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  4. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/6, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  5. Houy, Nicolas, 2008. "A note on the Suzumura-consistency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 90-95, January.
  6. Nicolas Houy, 2008. "Prudent choices and rationality," Working Papers hal-00360518, HAL.
  7. Houy, Nicolas, 2011. "A refinement of prudent choices," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 166-169, May.
  8. Matsuki, Jun & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2013. "Choice via Grouping Procedures," CCES Discussion Paper Series 52, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Nicolas Houy, 2008. "A refinement of prudent choices," Working Papers hal-00360523, HAL.

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