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Fair Collective Choice Rules: Their Origin and Relationship

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  • Yukihiro Nishimura

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    (Yokohama National University and Queen's University)

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    Abstract

    This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.

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    File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1179.pdf
    File Function: First version 2008
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1179.

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    Length: 13 pages
    Date of creation: Aug 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1179

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    Related research

    Keywords: Welfare Economics; Social Choice; Efficiency; Equity; No-Envy;

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    1. Feldman, Allan M & Kirman, Alan, 1974. "Fairness and Envy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 995-1005, December.
    2. Panzer, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1974. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 441-43, July.
    3. Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 455-473, 06.
    4. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1981. "On the Possibility of "Fair" Collective Choice Rule," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 351-64, June.
    5. Tadenuma, Koichi, 1998. "Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Discussion Papers 1998-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Goldman, Steven M. & Sussangkarn, Chal, 1978. "On the concept of fairness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 210-216, October.
    7. Tadenuma, Koichi, 2007. "Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off," Discussion Papers 2007-09, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    8. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1980. "On Distributional Value Judgments and Piecemeal Welfare Criteria," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 47(186), pages 125-39, May.
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