Yukihiro Nishimura () (Yokohama National University and Queen's University)
Abstract
This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
1179.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Feldman, Allan M & Kirman, Alan, 1974.
"Fairness and Envy,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 995-1005, December.
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