Fair Collective Choice Rules: Their Origin and Relationship
AbstractThis paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1179.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Welfare Economics; Social Choice; Efficiency; Equity; No-Envy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-08-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2008-08-31 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Feldman, Allan M & Kirman, Alan, 1974. "Fairness and Envy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 995-1005, December.
- Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002.
"Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences,"
128, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 455-473, 06.
- Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences," Discussion Papers 2002-08, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Suzumura, Kotaro, 1981. "On the Possibility of "Fair" Collective Choice Rule," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 351-64, June.
- Tadenuma, Koichi, 2007. "Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off," Discussion Papers 2007-09, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Suzumura, Kotaro, 1980. "On Distributional Value Judgments and Piecemeal Welfare Criteria," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 47(186), pages 125-39, May.
- Panzer, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1974. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 441-43, July.
- Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002.
"Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 462-472, June.
- Tadenuma, Koichi, 1998. "Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Discussion Papers 1998-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Goldman, Steven M. & Sussangkarn, Chal, 1978. "On the concept of fairness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 210-216, October.
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