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No-Envy, Efficiency, and Collective Rationality

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  • Sakamoto, Norihito
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    Abstract

    We consider the problem of a fair collective choice function (fair CCF) which maps each profile of extended preference orderings into the set of fair social states (the set consists of alternatives which are both Pareto efficient and envy-free) when such a set exists. Our main objective is to examine compatibility of fair social choices with collective rationality. We formulate desirable properties of collective rationality, and look for CCFs satisfying them. Next, we show that there is no CCF that satisfies most of the choice-consistency properties and a simple concept of fairness simultaneously. Moreover, we reveal that there exists no collective choice function that selects efficient and envy-free states cannot be rationalized by a social preference relation.

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    File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/19289/1/070econDP11-08.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2011-08.

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    Length: 23 p.
    Date of creation: Aug 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2011-08

    Note: This Version: August, 2011
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    1. Diamantaras, D. & Thomson, W., 1988. "A Refinement And Extension Of The No-Envy Concept," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) 133, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    2. Marc Fleurbaey & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 243-263, October.
    3. Tadenuma, Koichi, 1998. "Efficiency First or Equity First?: Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University 1998-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Goldman, Steven M. & Sussangkarn, Chal, 1978. "On the concept of fairness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 210-216, October.
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