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Symmetric Scoring Rules And A New Characterization Of The Borda Count

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  • Jac C. Heckelman
  • Robi Ragan

Abstract

Young developed a classic axiomatization of the Borda rule almost 50 years ago. He proved it is the only voting rule satisfying the normative properties of decisiveness, neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and cancellation. Often overlooked is that the uniqueness of Borda applies only to variable populations. We present a different set of properties which only Borda satisfies when both the set of voters and the set of alternatives can vary. It is also shown Borda is the only scoring rule which will satisfy all of the new properties when the number of voters stays fixed. (JEL D71, D02, H00)

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman & Robi Ragan, 2021. "Symmetric Scoring Rules And A New Characterization Of The Borda Count," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 287-299, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:59:y:2021:i:1:p:287-299
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12929
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1984. "The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(3), pages 719-730, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
    2. Guy Barokas & Yves Sprumont, 2022. "The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 187-199, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

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