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Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions

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  • Susumu Cato

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 71 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 503-518

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:71:y:2011:i:4:p:503-518

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

Related research

Keywords: Weak Pareto principle; Strong Pareto principle; Anonymity; Neutrality; Positive responsiveness; Method of majority decision; D70; D71;

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References

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  1. M. Sanver, 2009. "Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 461-471, June.
  2. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
  3. Yi, Jianxin, 2005. "A complete characterization of majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 109-112, April.
  4. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
  5. M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.
  6. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2006-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  7. Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2000. "A simple characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 689-700.
  8. Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2000. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 39-61, January.
  9. Kelly, Jerry S., 1974. "Necessity conditions in voting theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 149-160, June.
  10. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
  11. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2005. "More on the majority rule: Profiles, societies, and responsiveness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 7-11, July.
  12. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 185-92, April.
  13. Chipman, John S & Moore, James C, 1978. "The New Welfare Economics, 1939-1974," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(3), pages 547-84, October.
  14. Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1970. "Majority rule and rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 27-40, March.
  15. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2001. "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 281-286, April.
  16. Sen, Amartya, 1985. "Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1764-76, December.
  17. Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1969. "The Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 490-506, July.
  18. Susumu Cato, 2010. "Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 267-284, July.
  19. Fountain, John & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1982. "Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 299-308, June.
  20. Hansson, Bengt & Sahlquist, Henrik, 1976. "A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 193-200, October.
  21. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
  22. Blair, Douglas H. & Bordes, Georges & Kelly, Jerry S. & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1976. "Impossibility theorems without collective rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 361-379, December.
  23. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2008. "Erratum to "A characterization of consistent collective choice rules" [J. Econ. Theory 138 (2008) 311-320]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 355-355, May.
  24. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
  25. Mark Fey, 2004. "May’s Theorem with an infinite population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 275-293, October.
  26. Suzumura, Kotaro, 2001. "Pareto principles from Inch to Ell," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 95-98, January.
  27. J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
  28. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09.
  29. Sen, Amartya & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1969. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 178-202, August.
  30. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 563-579, October.
  2. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 511-527, April.
  3. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 169-202, June.

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