Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
AbstractAnonymity and neutrality conflict if the number of individuals is even and a single alternative is selected. Limited neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 118 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Anonymity; Monotonicity; Neutrality; Social choice function;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
- Yi, Jianxin, 2005. "A complete characterization of majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 109-112, April.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2011. "Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 272-273, March.
- Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2000. "A simple characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 689-700.
- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09.
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
- Michele Gori & Daniela Bubboloni, 2014. "Symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2014-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
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