Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity
Abstract
The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized in the two alternatives case. The main axioms rely on the idea of determining the preference of a group by partitioning it into two subgroups and aggregating next their preferences.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 111 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 151-154
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:2:p:151-154
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For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jeroen Loos).
Related research
Keywords: Social welfare function Relative majority rule Unanimity rule Axiomatic characterization Two alternatives;Other versions of this item:
- Quesada, Antonio, 2009. "Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity," MPRA Paper 19401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nicolas Houy, 2007. "A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(4), pages 1-8.
- J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
- Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
- Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
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