Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity
AbstractThe relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are only two alternatives. The main axioms are motivated by a principle of binary representativeness: the aggregation of the preferences of n voters is the result of splitting the n voters into two groups, aggregating the preferences of the voters of each group, selecting for each group a representative that adopts the preference of the group, and finally aggregating the preferences of the two representatives. The two characterizations are shown to differ from each other in just one axiom, expressing strategyproofness (unanimity) or group strategyproofness (majority).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 19401.
Date of creation: 16 Dec 2009
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Social welfare function; relative majority rule; unanimity rule; representativeness; axiomatic characterization; two alternatives.;
Other versions of this item:
- Quesada, Antonio, 2011. "Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 151-154, May.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-01-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-01-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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