Anonymous and neutral majority rules
AbstractIn the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We determine also general formulas for counting these rules and we explicitly determine their number in some special cases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa in its series Working Papers - Mathematical Economics with number 2013-02.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision: Oct 2013
Social welfare function; anonymity; neutrality; majority; linear order; group theory.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2008. "Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 108-110, July.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
- Michele Gori & Daniela Bubboloni, 2014. "Symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2014-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Michele Gori & Daniela Bubboloni, 2013. "Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-05, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
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