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A characterization of consistent collective choice rules

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  • Bossert, Walter
  • Suzumura, Kotaro

Abstract

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 138 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 311-320

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:138:y:2008:i:1:p:311-320

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References

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  1. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont & Kotaro Suzumura, 2005. "Consistent Rationalizability," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(286), pages 185-200, 05.
  2. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-58, September.
  3. John Weymark, 1984. "Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 235-246, January.
  4. Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-90, November.
  5. Sen, Amartya K, 1969. "Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(107), pages 381-93, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2009. "Decisive coalitions and coherence properties," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 427, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 169-202, June.
  3. Susumu Cato, 2012. "Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 869-889, October.
  4. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
  5. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2009. "Quasi-Transitive and Suzumura Consistent Relations," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 06-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  6. Susumu Cato, 2011. "Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 503-518, October.
  7. Allan M Feldman & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World," Working Papers 2007-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Asheim, Geir B. & Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2006. "Infinite-horizon choice functions," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 17/2006, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  9. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 563-579, October.
  10. Cato, Susumu, 2013. "Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 40-47.

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