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Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis

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  • Susumu Cato

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Abstract

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 869-889

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:4:p:869-889

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  1. Kelsey, David, 1984. "Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 693-99, October.
  2. Border, Kim C., 1983. "Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 205-216, April.
  3. Cato, Susumu, 2013. "Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 40-47.
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  5. Blair, Douglas H. & Bordes, Georges & Kelly, Jerry S. & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1976. "Impossibility theorems without collective rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 361-379, December.
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  7. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-43, July.
  8. Kirman, Alan P. & Sondermann, Dieter, 1972. "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 267-277, October.
  9. Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-90, November.
  10. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-91, November.
  11. Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2008. "A characterization of consistent collective choice rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 311-320, January.
  12. Susumu Cato & Daisuke Hirata, 2010. "Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 611-630, April.
  13. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
  14. Guha, Ashok, 1972. "Neutrality, Monotonicity, and the Right of Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(5), pages 821-26, September.
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  16. Blau, Julian H., 1979. "Semiorders and collective choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 195-206, August.
  17. Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 1998. "Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 147-162.
  18. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-45, August.
  19. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
  20. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 273-281, March.
  21. Luis Ubeda, 2003. "Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 195-204, December.
  22. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 185-92, April.
  23. Susumu Cato, 2010. "Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 267-284, July.
  24. Fountain, John & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1982. "Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 299-308, June.
  25. Miller, Michael K., 2009. "Social choice theory without Pareto: The pivotal voter approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 251-255, September.
  26. Brown, Donald J, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 456-69, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 511-527, April.
  2. Susumu Cato, 2013. "Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 563-579, October.

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