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A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules

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Author Info
BOSSERT, Walter
SUZUMURA, Kotaro

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Abstract

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2006-12.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-12

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Related research
Keywords: Collective Choice Rules Consistency Pareto Rule

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-58, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sen, Amartya K, 1969. "Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(107), pages 381-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-90, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont & Kotaro Suzumura, 2005. "Consistent Rationalizability," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(286), pages 185-200, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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