IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v42y1974i6p1129-31.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Note on Preference Aggregation

Author

Listed:
  • Young, H Peyton

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Young, H Peyton, 1974. "A Note on Preference Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(6), pages 1129-1131, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:42:y:1974:i:6:p:1129-31
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197411%2942%3A6%3C1129%3AANOPA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Chambers & Takashi Hayashi, 2012. "Money-metric utilitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 809-831, October.
    2. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    3. Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers halshs-02440615, HAL.
    4. Christopher P. Chambers & Siming Ye, 2023. "Haves and Have-Nots: A Theory of Economic Sufficientarianism," Papers 2301.08666, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    5. Klaus Nehring & Marcus Pivato, 2022. "The median rule in judgement aggregation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 1051-1100, June.
    6. Josep Freixas & Roger Hoerl & William S. Zwicker, 2023. "Nash's bargaining problem and the scale-invariant Hirsch citation index," Papers 2309.01192, arXiv.org.
    7. Florian Brandl & Dominik Peters, 2019. "An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(4), pages 685-707, April.
    8. Eliora Hout & Harrie Swart & Annemarie Veer, 2006. "Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 459-475, December.
    9. Vincent Merlin & İpek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "Compromise Rules Revisited," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, February.
    10. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.
    11. Pivato, Marcus, 2014. "Formal utilitarianism and range voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 50-56.
    12. Fuad Aleskerov & Vyacheslav Chistyakov & Valery Kalyagin, 2010. "Social threshold aggregations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(4), pages 627-646, October.
    13. Skowron, Piotr & Faliszewski, Piotr & Slinko, Arkadii, 2019. "Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 244-273.
    14. Jac C. Heckelman, 2023. "Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 125-132, February.
    15. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin & Faty Mbaye Top, 2023. "Scoring Run-off Rules, Single-peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate," Working Papers hal-03143741, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:42:y:1974:i:6:p:1129-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.