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On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

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  • GOERTZ, Johanna M.
  • MANIQUET, François

    ()
    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

Abstract

We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5], [6] and [7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2009026.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2009026

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Related research

Keywords: efficient information aggregation; scoring rules; Poisson games; approval voting;

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Cited by:
  1. Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.
  2. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games," Working Papers hal-00914890, HAL.
  3. Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, 2013. "Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections," Post-Print hal-00917099, HAL.
  4. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  5. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  7. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Working Papers hal-00914887, HAL.
  8. David S. Ahny & Santiago Oliveros, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 732, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  9. GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Francois Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2010. "Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/13, European University Institute.
  11. Johanna Goertz & Francois Maniquet, 2011. "On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 3457, CESifo Group Munich.

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