On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
AbstractWe study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer ,  and ). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2009026.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
efficient information aggregation; scoring rules; Poisson games; approval voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
- GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. & MANIQUET, François, . "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-03-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-03-28 (Game Theory)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.
- Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013.
"Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games,"
- Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, 2013.
"Preference Intensity Representation : Strategic Overstating in Large Elections,"
- Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
- Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
- Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael, 2008.
"One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, 01.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012.
"Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2012_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura & A. Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136800, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013.
"A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes,"
- David S. Ahny & Santiago Oliveros, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 732, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francois Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2010.
"Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2010/13, European University Institute.
- Johanna Goertz & Francois Maniquet, 2011. "On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 3457, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.