Two examples of strategic equilibrium
AbstractTwo examples of strategic equilibrium are given. The first example is a two-person game with a unique dominant strategy for each player where the dominant strategy equilibrium is not extensive form perfect. It is argued that the concept of quasi-perfect equilibria may be superior to that of perfect equilibria. The second example is a two-person game with perfect information, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and a unique stable set, but where the latter allows different outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 8 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Mertens, J.-F., . "Two examples of strategic equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1137, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MERTENS, Jean-François, 1992. "Two examples on strategic equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 1992008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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