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Two examples of strategic equilibrium

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Author Info

  • Mertens, J.-F.

Abstract

Two examples of strategic equilibrium are given. The first example is a two-person game with a unique dominant strategy for each player where the dominant strategy equilibrium is not extensive form perfect. It is argued that the concept of quasi-perfect equilibria may be superior to that of perfect equilibria. The second example is a two-person game with perfect information, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and a unique stable set, but where the latter allows different outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 8 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 378-388

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:378-388

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers 591, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  3. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Van Damme, E., 1991. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Papers 9107, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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Cited by:
  1. Peter Miltersen & Troels Sørensen, 2010. "Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 175-192, January.
  2. Carlos Pimienta & Jianfei Shen, 2011. "On the Equivalence between (Quasi)-perfect and sequential equilibria," Discussion Papers 2012-01, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.

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