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Two examples of strategic equilibrium

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  • MERTENS, J.-F.

Abstract

Two examples of strategic equilibrium are given. The first example is a two-person game with a unique dominant strategy for each player where the dominant strategy equilibrium is not extensive form perfect. It is argued that the concept of quasi-perfect equilibria may be superior to that of perfect equilibria. The second example is a two-person game with perfect information, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and a unique stable set, but where the latter allows different outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
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  • Mertens, J.-F., 1995. "Two examples of strategic equilibrium," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1137, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1137
    DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80007-7
    Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 378-388, 1995
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. van Damme, E.E.C., 1991. "Refinements of Nash equilibrium," Discussion Paper 1991-7, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Myerson, R B, 1986. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 133-154.
    4. van Damme, E.E.C., 1984. "A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games," Other publications TiSEM 3734d89e-fd5c-4c80-a230-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    6. MERTENS, Jean-François, 1991. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the definition, and further results," LIDAM Reprints CORE 960, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Günther Lang, 2001. "Bargaining and the observability of contractual commitments via third parties," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 7(2), pages 213-230, May.
    2. Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto, 2020. "A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 240-255.
    3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
    4. Balkenborg, Dieter & Vermeulen, Dries, 2019. "On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 1-6.
    5. Peter Miltersen & Troels Sørensen, 2010. "Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 175-192, January.
    6. Nicola, Gatti & Mario, Gilli & Fabio, Panozzo, 2016. "Further results on verification problems in extensive-form games," Working Papers 347, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jul 2016.
    7. Carlos Pimienta & Jianfei Shen, 2014. "On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 395-402, May.
    8. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17015, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    9. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Post-Print halshs-01491935, HAL.
    10. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17015r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised May 2017.
    11. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game," HSE Working papers WP BRP 157/EC/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    12. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01491935, HAL.
    13. Etessami, Kousha, 2021. "The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 107-140.
    14. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Non-Altruistic Equilibria," MPRA Paper 88347, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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