Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game
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References listed on IDEAS
- Mertens, J.-F., 1995.
"Two examples of strategic equilibrium,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 378-388.
- MERTENS, Jean-François, 1992. "Two examples on strategic equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 1992008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Maskin, Eric, 2011. "Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 9-11, January.
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More about this item
KeywordsNoncooperative games; Nash equilibrium; Shapley value; strong equilibrium; core;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2017-04-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2017-04-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2017-04-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2017-04-02 (Microeconomics)
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