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Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game

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  • Dmitry Levando

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics [Moscow], CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This paper suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non-cooperative game theory. Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition externalities. In this family, games differ by the size of maximum coalition, partitions and by coalition structure formation rules. A result of every game consists of partition of players into coalitions and a payoff profile for every player. Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly more than one coalition. The results of the game differ from those conventionally discussed in cooperative game theory, e.g. the Shapley value, strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus. We discuss the following applications of the new game: cooperation as an allocation in one coalition, Bayesian games, stochastic games and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal points.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01491935, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01491935
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01491935v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mertens, J.-F., 1995. "Two examples of strategic equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 378-388.
    2. Maskin, Eric, 2011. "Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 9-11, January.
    3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
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    Keywords

    Noncooperative games; Nash equilibrium; Shapley value; strong equilibrium; core;

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