Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game
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More about this item
Keywords
Noncooperative games; Nash equilibrium; Shapley value; strong equilibrium; core;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2018-07-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2018-07-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2018-07-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2018-07-16 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
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