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Maximal stable sets of two-player games

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Author Info
Srihari Govindan () (Dept. of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada N6A 5C2)
Robert Wilson () (Stanford Business School, Stanford CA 94305-5015, USA)

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Abstract

If a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are connected components of perfect equilibria.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 557-566
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:557-566

Note: Received: October 1999/Revised: February 2001
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Related research
Keywords: Perfect equilibria; stable sets.;

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000231, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vermeulen,Dries & Jansen,Mathijs, 2004. "On the computation of stable sets for bimatrix games," Research Memoranda 020, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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