Maximal stable sets of two-player games
AbstractIf a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are connected components of perfect equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: October 1999/Revised: February 2001
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Open Access publications from Maastricht University
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