The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 4 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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- Bernhard von Stengel & Antoon van den Elzen & Dolf Talman, 2002.
"Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 693-715, March.
- Stengel, B. von & Elzen, A.H. van den & Talman, A.J.J., 2002. "Computing normal form perfect equilibria for extensive two-person games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88290, Tilburg University.
- Stengel, B. von & Elzen, A.H. van den & Talman, A.J.J., 1997. "Computing normal form perfect equilibria for extensive two-person games," Research Memorandum 752, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- Conitzer, Vincent & Sandholm, Tuomas, 2008. "New complexity results about Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 621-641, July.
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- F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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2021, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2012. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two‐Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1639-1699, 07.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000231, David K. Levine.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000203, David K. Levine.
- von Stengel, Bernhard & Koller, Daphne, 1997. "Team-Maxmin Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 309-321, October.
- Bernhard Stengel, 2010. "Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 1-7, January.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form," Research Papers 1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Tim Roughgarden, 2010. "Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 193-236, January.
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