On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty

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On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty

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Gul, Faruk
Sonnenschein, Hugo

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Abstract

Recently, attention has been given to a model of two-person bargaining in which the parties alternate making of fers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party. The p urpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process, where agents with relatively lower valuations dis tinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle. The authors point ou t a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that th e assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far a s the time between offers is significant. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 56 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 601-11
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:3:p:601-11

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Dilip Abreu & David Pearce, 2003. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1446, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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- D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 1997. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 1190, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bart L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 1997. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Working Papers 955, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 149-190, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Joel Watson, 1995. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 94-13r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1988. "Efficient Sequential Bargaining," Discussion Papers 804, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, 2003. "Unions, Bargaining and Strikes," Papers of Peter Cramton 02ubs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 05 Sep 2002. [Downloadable!]
Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bjoern Bruegemann & Giuseppe Moscarini, 2007. "Rent Rigidity, Asymmetric Information, and Volatility Bounds in Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 13030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Giuseppe Lopomo & Efe A Ok, 2001. "Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000114, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Efe A. Ok, 1998. "Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division," Working Papers 98-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Efe A Ok, 2004. "Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000395, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Lopomo, Giuseppe & Ok, Efe A, 2001. "Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 263-83, Summer.
Tadashi Ito, 2007. "NAFTA and productivity convergence between Mexico and the US," HEI Working Papers 26-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised 09 Jun 2009. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1989. "Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent," Discussion Papers 856, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, 1991. "Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization," NBER Technical Working Papers 0097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bebchuk, Lucian Ayre & Chang, Howard F, 1992. "Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 253-79, April.
Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1988. "Stationary Sequential Equilibria in Bargaining With Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 784, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
David Nickerson & Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand, 1994. "Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 125-154, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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