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A two-person game of information transmission

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  • Green, Jerry R.
  • Stokey, Nancy L.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4KNKH3K-2/2/766deff68af77d3b1bb1c882698837a6
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 135 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 90-104

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:135:y:2007:i:1:p:90-104

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References

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  1. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  2. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2008. "Broken Promises: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6836m74q, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  2. Gaynor, Martin, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-55, Spring.
  3. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2000. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0341, Econometric Society.
  4. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  5. Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2011. "An Optimal Signaling Equilibrium," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-148/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
  7. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
  8. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
  9. Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2011. "An Optimal Signaling Equilibrium," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-148/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  10. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Bing Jing, 2011. "Seller honesty and product line pricing," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 403-427, December.
  12. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
  13. Chen, Ying, 2012. "Value of public information in sender–receiver games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 343-345.
  14. Eyal Sulganik & Itzhak Zilcha, 1994. "The Value of Information: Disadvantageous Risk-Sharing Markets," Microeconomics 9405001, EconWPA, revised 19 May 1994.
  15. Forges, Françoise, 2010. "Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5279, Paris Dauphine University.

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