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Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations

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Author Info

  • Forges, F.
  • Minelli, E.

Abstract

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 9605.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9605

Contact details of provider:
Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.

Related research

Keywords: EXPECTATIONS; GAMES; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION;

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Cited by:
  1. BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Switching from complete to incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers 2005063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  3. Giraud, Gael, 2003. "Strategic market games: an introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 355-375, July.
  4. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
  5. MINELLI, Enrico & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 2000. "Information at equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 2000004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Lorenzo Rocco, 2001. "Nonatomic Games with Limited Anonymity," Working Papers 39, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2001.
  7. Heifetz, Aviad & Minelli, Enrico, 2002. "Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 197-218, September.
  8. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2003. "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 421-431, July.

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