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Partially-Specified Large Games

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  • Ehud Kalai

Abstract

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully speci?ed. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More- over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi- anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1403.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 784828000000000565.

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Date of creation: 05 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000565

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References

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  1. Jordan, James S. & Radner, Roy, 1982. "Rational expectations in microeconomic models: An overview," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 201-223, April.
  2. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
  3. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  4. F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996. "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," THEMA Working Papers 96-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  5. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, Penn Economics Department.
  6. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
  7. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  8. Thomas J. Sargent & LarsPeter Hansen, 2001. "Robust Control and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 60-66, May.
  9. Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
  10. Peck, James, 2003. "Large market games with demand uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 283-299, April.
  11. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  12. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January.
  13. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
  2. Ehud Kalai, 2006. "Structural Robustness of Large Games," Discussion Papers 1431, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Valeska Groenert, 2013. "Trimmed equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 99-114, February.
  4. Jiang, Albert Xin & Leyton-Brown, Kevin & Bhat, Navin A.R., 2011. "Action-Graph Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 141-173, January.
  5. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  6. Julio González-Díaz & Federica Briata & Ignacio García-Jurado & Fioravante Patrone, 2012. "Essential collections for equilibrium concepts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 517-552, August.
  7. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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