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On Purification Of Equilibrium In Bayesian Games And Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium

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Author Info
Cartwright, Edward (EUREQUA, Paris 1)
Wooders, Myrna (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

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Abstract

We demonstrate that if any realization of a strategy for a Bayesiangame is, with high probability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also provide two examples demonstrating, amongst other things, that the bound we obtain on the distance of the purification from satisfying the requirements for an exact equilibrium is tight.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/twerp701.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 701.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:701

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Related research
Keywords: purification ; expost Nash ; Bayesian games;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players," Working Papers 2003.122, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1984. "On a theorem of Schmeidler," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 201-206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rui Pascoa, Mario, 1993. "Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for non-atomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 223-241. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 2002. "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive 482, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2421-2453, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Mario Rui Pascoa, 1998. "Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 83-92. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 137-153, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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