On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium
We demonstrate that if any realization of a strategy for a Bayesiangame is, with high probability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also provide two examples demonstrating, amongst other things, that the bound we obtain on the distance of the purification from satisfying the requirements for an exact equilibrium is tight.
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Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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