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On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium

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Abstract

We demonstrate that if any realization of a strategy for a Bayesiangame is, with high probability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also provide two examples demonstrating, amongst other things, that the bound we obtain on the distance of the purification from satisfying the requirements for an exact equilibrium is tight.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 127-136, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:127-136
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y
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    1. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 137-153, March.
    2. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng, 1997. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 13-46, September.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 137-153, March.
    4. Carmona, Guilherme, 2008. "Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(12), pages 1302-1311, December.
    5. Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud, 2015. "Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1041-1055.
    6. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2013. "Large games with a bio-social typology," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1122-1149.

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    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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