Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces
We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large but finite number of players that allows compact metric spaces for both actions and types. We then compare our framework and findings to the early purification theorems of Rashid (1983. Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: asymptotic results. Economics Letters 12, 7-10), Cartwright and Wooders (2002 On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. University of Warwick Working Paper 686 (revised 2005)), Kalai (2004. Large robust games. Econometrica 72, 1631-1665) and Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2006. Behavioral conformity in games with many players. Games and Economic Behavior 57, 347-360). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem.
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- Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10.
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- Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games," Game Theory and Information 0311007, EconWPA.
- P. D., 1988. "Introduction," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 10(4), pages 527, July.
- Ehud Kalai, 2004.
"Large Robust Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
- Wooders, Myrna & Cartwright, Edward & Selten, Reinhard, 2006.
"Behavioral conformity in games with many players,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 347-360, November.
- Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright & Reinhard Selten, 2005. "Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0513, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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