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Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games


Motivated by Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) , we consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate preferences. We show that any such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the set of attributes into a bounded number of convex sets with the following property: all players with an attribute in the interior of the same element of the partition play the same action. We then use this result to show that all sufficiently large, equicontinuous games with intermediate preferences have an approximate equilibrium with the same property. Our result on behavior conformity for large finite game generalizes Theorem 3 of Wooders et al. (2006) by allowing both a wider class of preferences and a more general attribute space. Copyright � 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

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Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 9-25

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:1:p:9-25
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  1. Rath, Kali P, 1995. "Representation of Finite Action Large Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 23-35.
  2. Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp466, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  3. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
  4. Khan, M. Ali & Yeneng, Sun, 1995. "Pure strategies in games with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 633-653.
  5. Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10.
  6. Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright & Reinhard Selten, 2005. "Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0513, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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