On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games
We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players' payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on the diversity of payoffs is needed in order for such asymptotic result to be valid.
|Date of creation:||22 Nov 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; prepared on win xp; to print on general; pages: 6; figures: 0. none|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10.
- Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng, 1997.
"On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 13-46, September.
- M Ali Khan & Kali P Rath & Yeneng Sun, 1994. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economics Working Paper Archive 381, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Feb 1997.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.