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A unified approach to the purification of Nash equilibria in large games

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  • Guilherme Carmona

Abstract

We present a puri¯cation result for incomplete information games with a large ¯nite number of players that allows for compact metric spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the puri¯cation theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai (2004). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Guilherme Carmona, 2006. "A unified approach to the purification of Nash equilibria in large games," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp491, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp491
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng, 1997. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 13-46, September.
    2. Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 215-219, November.
    3. Balder, Erik J., 2002. "A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 437-470, February.
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