A Uni¯ed Approach to the Puri¯cation of Nash Equilibria in Large Games
We present a puri¯cation result for incomplete information games with a large ¯nite number of players that allows for compact metric spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the puri¯cation theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai (2004). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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- Carmona, Guilherme, 2004.
"On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games,"
Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 215-219, November.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games," Game Theory and Information 0311007, EconWPA.
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2003. "On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp436, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Balder, Erik J., 2002. "A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 437-470, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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