Extremal Choice Equilibrium: Existence and Purification with Infinite-Dimensional Externalities
We prove existence and purification results for equilibria in which players choose extreme points of their feasible actions in a class of strategic environments exhibiting a product structure. We assume finite-dimensional action sets and allow for infinite-dimensional externalities. Applied to large games, we obtain existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies while allowing a continuum of groups and general dependence of payoffs on average actions across groups, without resorting to saturated measure spaces. Applied to games of incomplete information, we obtain a new purification result for Bayes-Nash equilibria that permits substantial correlation across types, without assuming conditional independence given the realization of a finite environmental state. We highlight our results in examples of industrial organization, auctions, and voting.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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Economics Working Paper Archive
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