Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot-Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79-94; On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games, J. Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207-223; A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 437-470] to games with possibly non-ordered preferences, providing a continuum analogue of the seminal existence results by Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive preferences, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 237-246], Gale and Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 9-15], Shafer and Sonnenschein [Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 345-348], Borglin and Keiding [Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium: a note on the "new" existence theorems, J. Math. Econ. 3 (1976) 313-316] and Yannelis and Prabhakar [Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in linear topological spaces, J. Math. Econ. 12 (1983) 233-245].
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