IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v24y1995i1p79-94.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Unifying Approach to Existence of Nash Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Balder, Erik J

Abstract

An approach initiated in [4] is shown to unify results about the existence of (1) Nash equilibria in games with at most countably many players, (2) Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions for large, anonymous games, and (3) Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) for continuum games. A new, central notion of mixed externality is developed for this purpose.

Suggested Citation

  • Balder, Erik J, 1995. "A Unifying Approach to Existence of Nash Equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(1), pages 79-94.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:79-94
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Youcef Askoura, 2019. "On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players : a correction," Papers 1903.09819, arXiv.org.
    2. Camacho, Carmen & Kamihigashi, Takashi & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2018. "Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 288-299.
    3. Askoura, Y., 2017. "On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 32-42.
    4. Xinmin Hu & Daniel Ralph, 2007. "Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 809-827, October.
    5. Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2012. "Social Decision Theory: Choosing within and between Groups," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(4), pages 1591-1636.
    6. Balder, Erik J., 2000. "Incompatibility of Usual Conditions for Equilibrium Existence in Continuum Economies without Ordered Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 110-117, July.
    7. Wei He & Yeneng Sun, 2018. "Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(2), pages 265-299, August.
    8. Peter Helgesson & Bernt Wennberg, 2015. "The N-Player War of Attrition in the Limit of Infinitely Many Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 65-93, March.
    9. Balder, Erik J., 2003. "On undominated Nash equilibria for games with a measure space of players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 137-140, August.
    10. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2016. "Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 147-177, August.
    11. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Agnieszka, 2005. "Stock market as a dynamic game with continuum of players," MPRA Paper 32982, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2006.
    12. Yang, Jian, 2022. "A Bayesian nonatomic game and its applicability to finite-player situations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    13. Balder, Erik J., 2002. "A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 437-470, February.
    14. Jian Yang, 2023. "Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 861-889, September.
    15. Yang, Zhe, 2020. "The weak α-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 43-50.
    16. Balder, Erik J., 2008. "More on equilibria in competitive markets with externalities and a continuum of agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 575-602, July.
    17. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2014. "Open and Closed Loop Nash Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 280-301, January.
    18. Jian Yang, 2021. "Analysis of Markovian Competitive Situations Using Nonatomic Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 184-216, March.
    19. Sun, Xiang & Zeng, Yishu, 2020. "Perfect and proper equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 288-308.
    20. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2017. "Redefinition of Belief Distorted Nash Equilibria for the Environment of Dynamic Games with Probabilistic Beliefs," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 984-1007, March.
    21. Fabio Maccheroni Jr. & Massimo Marinacci Jr. & Aldo Rustichini Jr., 2014. "Pride and Diversity in Social Economies," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 237-271, November.
    22. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, V. & Topuzu, Mihaela, 2008. "Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 314-327, May.
    23. Hu, X. & Ralph, R., 2006. "Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:79-94. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.