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Anonymity in Nonatomic Games

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  • Lorenzo Rocco

    (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca)

Abstract

In nonatomic games, anonymity must be assumed in order to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This can be formalized by making payoffs dependent either on the players' distribution on the action set or on the strategy mean. An extension of Rath's (1992) proof to the case of limited anonymity is proposed: the behavior of the population as a whole, is shown sufficient to get equilibrium existence in pure strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Rocco, 2002. "Anonymity in Nonatomic Games," Working Papers 53, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2002.
    • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:53
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