Partially-Specified Large Games
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully speci?ed. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More- over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi- anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.
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