Partially-Specified Large Games
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully speci?ed. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More- over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi- anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harsanyi, John C., 1994.
"Games with Incomplete Information,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
- Thomas J. Sargent & LarsPeter Hansen, 2001. "Robust Control and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 60-66, May.
- F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996.
"Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games,"
THEMA Working Papers
96-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002.
"Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2421-2453, November.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, Penn Economics Department.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," CARESS Working Papres 99-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980.
"On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
- Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
- Peck, James, 2003. "Large market games with demand uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 283-299, April.
- V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
544, David K. Levine.
- Ehud Kalai, 2002.
"Large Robust Games,"
1350, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jordan, James S. & Radner, Roy, 1982. "Rational expectations in microeconomic models: An overview," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 201-223, April.
- Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
- Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000565. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.