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On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players

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Author Info
Edward Cartwright () (Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent)
Myrna Wooders () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

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Abstract

Treating games of incomplete information with countable sets of actions and types and finite but large player sets we demonstrate that for every mixed strategy profile there is a pure strategy profile that is 'epsilon-equivalent'. Our framework introduces and exploits a distinction between crowding attributes of players (their external effects on others) and their taste attributes (their payoff functions and any other attributes that are not directly relevant to other players). The main assumption is a 'large game' property, dictating that the actions of relatively small subsets of players cannot have large effects on the payoffs of others Since it is well known that, even allowing mixed strategies, with a countable set of actions a Nash equilibrium may not exist, we provide an existence of equilibrium theorem. The proof of existence relies on a relationship between the 'better reply security' property of Reny (1999) and a stronger version of the large game property. Our purification theorem are based on a new mathematical result, of independent interest, applicable to countable strategy spaces.

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File URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu05-w11.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2005
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University in its series Working Papers with number 0511.

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Date of creation: Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0511

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Related research
Keywords: Noncooperative games incomplete information purification crowding attributes large game property countable action set better reply security

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 0512, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Offerman, Theo & Potters, Jan & Sonnemans, Joep, 2002. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(4), pages 973-97, October.
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  4. Wooders, Myrna & Edward Cartwright & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity And Equilibrium In Pure Strategies In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 636, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rath, Kali P. & Yeneng Sun & Shinji Yamashige, 1995. "The nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in anonymous games with compact action spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 331-346. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 215-219, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Pascoa Mario Rui, 1993. "Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 335-353, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 1997. "Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 421-440, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cripps, Martin W. & Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2002. "Strategic Experimentation: The Case of Poisson Bandits," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  11. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  13. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 367-387, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 1999. "Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 455-492, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Mario Rui Pascoa, 1998. "Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 83-92. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Green, Edward J., 1982. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Working Papers 418, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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