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Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium; Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping

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  • Edward Cartwright

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent)

  • Myrna Wooders

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium: within-group anonymity, group independence, predictable group behavior and stereotyped beliefs. We then demonstrate that (a) a correlated equilibrium satisfying these properties exists in games with many players (b) a player who stereotypes other players cannot do better with correct beliefs and (c) correlation allows predictability of group behavior, which ensures that a correlated equilibrium is approximately ex-post stable.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu08-w14.pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0814.

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Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0814

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Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

Related research

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; correlated equilibrium; large games; behavioral conformity; stereotyping; identity; expost stability; group anonymity; group independence; predictable group behavior;

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References

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  1. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 137-153, March.
  2. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 732, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Ünver, 2003. "Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0309005, EconWPA, revised 06 Sep 2003.
  5. Gravel, Nicolas & Thoron, Sylvie, 2007. "Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 569-583, January.
  6. Robson, Arthur J & Wooders, Myrna, 1997. "On the Growth-Maximizing Distribution of Income," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(3), pages 511-26, August.
  7. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "Adaptive Heuristics," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp372, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  8. Wooders, Myrna & Cartwright, Edward & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Behavioral conformity in games with many players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 347-360, November.
  9. Sergio Currarini & Paolo Pin & Matthew O. Jackson, 2007. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation," Working Papers 2007_20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  10. Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean Francois, 1996. "Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 279-302, February.
  11. Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Social Conformity in Games with Many Players," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2003.121, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  12. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
  13. Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A. & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 111-136, April.
  14. Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 687, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  15. Shaun Hargreaves-Heap & Yanis Varoufakis, 2002. "Some Experimental Evidence On The Evolution Of Discrimination, Co--Operation And Perceptions Of Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 679-703, July.
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