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Conditional Corruption

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  • Bin Dong
  • Uwe Dulleck
  • Benno Torgler

Abstract

We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This implies that people observe a lower probability to be involved in corruption if on average the guilt level of others within a country is higher. We also explore whether - and to what extent - group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. In other words, we explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of ?conditional corruption? for these effects. The empirical section presents evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set covering almost 20 years. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2008-29.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-29

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Keywords: corruption; contagion effect; conditional cooperation; interdependent preferences;

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  1. Links: Prostitution. Small schools. Spain. Corruption.
    by UDADISI in udadisi on 2012-01-17 11:21:00
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Cited by:
  1. Bobkova, Nina & Egbert, Henrik, 2012. "Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature," MPRA Paper 38163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Dimant, Eugen, 2013. "The nature of corruption: An interdisciplinary perspective," Economics Discussion Papers 2013-59, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  3. Lee, Wang-Sheng & Guven, Cahit, 2013. "Engaging in Corruption: The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level," IZA Discussion Papers 7685, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Benno Torgler & María A.García-Valiñas & Alison Macintyre, 2008. "Environmental Participation and Environmental Motivation," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), revised Jan 2009.
  5. Bin Dong & Benno Torgler, 2010. "Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China," CREMA Working Paper Series 2010-22, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  6. Asongu Simplice, 2012. "Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count: what do wealth-effects tell us in Africa?," Working Papers 12/014, African Governance and Development Institute..
  7. Van-Ha Le & Jakob de Haan & Erik Dietzenbacher, 2013. "Do Higher Government Wages Reduce Corruption? Evidence Based on a Novel Dataset," CESifo Working Paper Series 4254, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. repec:qut:qubewp:wp014 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Eugen Dimant, 2014. "The Nature of Corruption - An Interdisciplinary Perspective," Working Papers 79, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  10. Eugen Dimant, 2013. "The Nature of Corruption - An Interdisciplinary Perspective," Working Papers 70, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  11. Maria Kravtsova & Aleksey Oshchepkov & Christian Welzel, 2014. "Corruption and social values: do postmaterialists justify bribery?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 34/SOC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  12. Niklas Potrafke, 2014. "The Evidence on Globalization," CESifo Working Paper Series 4708, CESifo Group Munich.

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