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Some Experimental Evidence On The Evolution Of Discrimination, Co--Operation And Perceptions Of Fairness

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  • Shaun Hargreaves-Heap

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Yanis Varoufakis

    (University of Sydney and University of Athens)

Abstract

When two people agree to trade, they unlock a mutual benefit, resolve a potential conflict and gain in proportion to their relative "aggression", eg the Hawk--Dove game. In an experiment with this game, a discriminatory convention evolved when half of the players were randomly assigned a red and the other half a blue label. Later, the same players were also offered the option of co--operating. Those disadvantaged by the colour--based discriminatory convention co--operated with one another most of the time while the rest did not. The paper offers an explanation of these observations based on a modification of Rabin (1993). The weaker are always anxious for justice and equality. The strong pay heed to neither. (Aristotle, "Politics", s1318b) Copyright 2002 Royal Economic Society

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 112 (2002)
Issue (Month): 481 (July)
Pages: 679-703

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:112:y:2002:i:481:p:679-703

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References

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  1. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  2. Schotter, A. & Weiss, A. & Zapater, I., 1993. "Fairness and Survival in Ultimatum and Dictatorship Games," Working Papers 93-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  3. Babcock, Linda, et al, 1995. "Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1337-43, December.
  4. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
  5. Erev, Ido & Bereby-Meyer, Yoella & Roth, Alvin E., 1999. "The effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: experimental investigation, and implications for reinforcement learning models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 111-128, May.
  6. Bacharach, Michael, 1999. "Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 117-147, June.
  7. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January.
  8. Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-73, June.
  9. Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gerhard Riener & Alexander Schacht, 2011. "Group Identity and Discrimination in Small Markets: Asymmetry of In-Group Favors," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-043, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  2. Antonio Filippin, 2003. "Discrimination and workers' expectations: experimental evidence," Departmental Working Papers 2003-16, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  3. Gianluca Grimalda & Anirban Kar & Eugenio Proto, 2012. "Everyone Wants a Chance: Initial Positions and Fairness in Ultimatum Games," Working Papers 2012/21, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  4. Fabio Galeotti & Daniel John Zizzo, 2012. "Trust and trustworthiness with singleton groups," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 12-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  5. Swee-Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann & Jeremy Larner, 2011. "Escalation Bargaining: Theoretical Analysis and Experimental Test," Discussion Papers 2011-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  6. Harrison, Mark, 2012. "Communism and Economic Modernization," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 92, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  7. Kei Tsutsui & Daniel John Zizzo, 2010. "Group status, minorities, and trust," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 10-10, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  8. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results," Working Papers 2003.119, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  9. Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 732, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  10. Shaun Hargreaves Heap, 2008. "Social capital and snake oil," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 199-207, September.
  11. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2010. "An evolutionary theory of social justice: Choosing the right game," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 320-329, September.
  12. Shaun Hargreaves Heap, 2011. "The magic of the market," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 105-115, March.
  13. Hugh Jones, David; Leroch, Martin A, 2011. "Reciprocity towards Groups," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 52, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  14. Daniel Zizzo, 2011. "You are not in my boat: common fate and discrimination against outgroup members," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 91-103, March.
  15. Federica Alberti & Shaun Hargreaves Heap & Robert Sugden, 2011. "The emergence of salience: An experimental investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 11-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  16. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium; Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0814, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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