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On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games

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Author Info
Van Huyck, John B
Battalio, Raymond C
Rankin, Frederick W
Abstract

The authors report the results of a coordination game experiment. The experiment carefully distinguishes between conventions based on labels and conventions based on populations. Their labels treatments investigate the abstraction assumptions that underlie the concept of a strategy, while their population treatments investigate the attraction of alternative mutually consistent ways to play under adaptive behavior. The authors observe conventions emerging in communities with one population and labels and with two populations and no labels, but the most effective treatment is two labeled populations. They estimate logistic response learning models for individual subject behavior. Of the models considered, a version of exponential fictitious play fits the authors' data best. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 107 (1997)
Issue (Month): 442 (May)
Pages: 576-96
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:107:y:1997:i:442:p:576-96

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  1. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity," Working Papers 0526, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. John Cadigan, 2005. "The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 197-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, . "An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination," Virginia Economics Online Papers 326, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Martin Sefton, 1999. "A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 151-164, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Quazi Shahriar & Subhasish Dugar, 2009. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: Role of Relative Label Salience," Working Papers 0033, San Diego State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bernardo A. Huberman & Tad Hogg HP Laboratories, 2003. "Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 0306005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247. [Downloadable!]
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