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Group formation: The interaction of increasing returns and preferences' diversity

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  • Gabrielle Demange

    (DELTA - Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR8545)

Abstract

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on competition in a simple economy under increasing returns to scale and heterogeneous consumers. The concept of sustainable oligopoly is discussed and analyzed. Section 3 studies in a more general and abstract set up competition among groups in the absence of spillovers. Whereas Section 3 develops some insights of Section 2, it can be read first. Finally Section 4 analyzes public decisions in a simple public good economy through the previous approach, and addresses the interaction between free mobility and free entry under negative externalities.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00573563.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published, Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions, Cambridge University Press (Ed.), 2005, 171-208
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00573563

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Keywords: group formation;

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  1. Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1988. " Increasing Returns to Size and Their Limits," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 259-73.
  2. Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1981. "Second best taxation as a game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 67-91, August.
  3. Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982. "Cores of Partitioning Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 620, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  5. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
  7. Sharkey,William W., 1983. "The Theory of Natural Monopoly," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521271943.
  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 393-413, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Abigail Barr & Orazio Attanasio, 2009. "Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks," Economics Series Working Papers CSAE WPS/2009-20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Sun, N. & Trockel, W. & Yang, Z.F., 2004. "Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2004-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Gabrielle Demange, 2010. "Sharing information in web communities," Working Papers 246546, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  4. Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna, 2007. "Networks and clubs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(3-4), pages 406-425.
  5. Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2005. "Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0529, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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