Group formation: The interaction of increasing returns and preferences' diversity
AbstractThe chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on competition in a simple economy under increasing returns to scale and heterogeneous consumers. The concept of sustainable oligopoly is discussed and analyzed. Section 3 studies in a more general and abstract set up competition among groups in the absence of spillovers. Whereas Section 3 develops some insights of Section 2, it can be read first. Finally Section 4 analyzes public decisions in a simple public good economy through the previous approach, and addresses the interaction between free mobility and free entry under negative externalities.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00573563.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions, Cambridge University Press (Ed.), 2005, 171-208
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00573563/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Other versions of this item:
- Gabrielle Demange, 2004. "Group formation: The interaction of increasing returns and preferences' diversity," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supÃ©rieure) 2004-30, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1988. " Increasing Returns to Size and Their Limits," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 259-73.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1981.
"Second best taxation as a game,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 67-91, August.
- Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982.
"Cores of Partitioning Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
620, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991.
"Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives,"
Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research
9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structure with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics 91-11, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC) 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
- Sharkey,William W., 1983. "The Theory of Natural Monopoly," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521271943.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 393-413, April.
- Abigail Barr & Orazio Attanasio, 2009.
"Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks,"
Economics Series Working Papers
CSAE WPS/2009-20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Orazio Attanasio & Abigail Barr & Juan Camilo Cardenas & Garance Genicot & Costas Meghir, 2012. "Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 134-67, April.
- Garance Genicot, Orazio Attanasio, Abigail Barr, Juan Camilo Cardenas and Costas Meghir, 2011. "Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~11-11-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Orazio Attansio & Abigail Barr & Juan Camilo Cardenas & Garance Genicot & Costas Mehgir, 2009. "Risk Pooling, Risk preferences, and Social Networks," CSAE Working Paper Series 2009-20, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Sun, N. & Trockel, W. & Yang, Z.F., 2004.
"Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game,"
Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
2004-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
- Sun,N. & Trockel,W. & Yang,Z., 2004. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Working Papers 358, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2010.
"Sharing information in web communities,"
246546, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
- Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna, 2007. "Networks and clubs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(3-4), pages 406-425.
- Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2005. "Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0529, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.