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Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players

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Author Info

  • Myrna Wooders

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

  • Edward Cartwright

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent)

  • Reinhard Selten

    (Department of Economics, University of Bonn)

Abstract

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such behavior can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we introduce a notion of a society and characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such an equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of 'crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player -- those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others -- and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With the assumptions of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu05-w13.pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0513.

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Date of creation: Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0513

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Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

Related research

Keywords: Behavioral conformity; noncooperative games; pregames; Nash equilibrium; purification; social norms; behavioral norms;

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References

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  1. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
  2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October.
  3. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
  4. Cartwright, Edward, 2003. "Learning To Play Approximate Nash Equilibria In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 671, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2003.119, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Wooders, M. & Selten, R. & Cartwright, E., 2001. "Some First Results for Noncooperative Pregames : Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 589, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  7. Ehud Kalai, 2000. "Private Information in Large Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1312, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1994. "Equivalence of Games and Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1141-60, September.
  9. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
  10. Rui Pascoa, Mario, 1993. "Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for non-atomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 223-241.
  11. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1984. "On a theorem of Schmeidler," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 201-206, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Daniel S Hamermesh & Michael C Burda & Philippe Weil, 2008. "Different but Equal: Total Work, Gender and Social Norms in EU and US Time Use," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8642, Sciences Po.
  2. Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2009. "On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1300-1319, May.
  3. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  4. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 0511, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  5. Carmona, Guilherme, 2008. "Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(12), pages 1302-1311, December.
  6. Cartwright, Edward, 2009. "Social norms: Does it matter whether agents are rational or boundedly rational?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 403-410, June.
  7. Carmona, Guilherme, 2007. "Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp523, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  8. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2012. "Mandating behavioral conformity in social groups with conformist members," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 479-493.
  9. Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright, 2012. "Correlated Equilibrium, Confirmity and Stereotyping in Social Groups," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics 2012-014, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  10. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
  11. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium; Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 0814, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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