Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games
AbstractMotivated by Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) , we consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate preferences. We show that any such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the set of attributes into a bounded number of convex sets with the following property: all players with an attribute in the interior of the same element of the partition play the same action. We then use this result to show that all sufficiently large, equicontinuous games with intermediate preferences have an approximate equilibrium with the same property. Our result on behavior conformity for large finite game generalizes Theorem 3 of Wooders et al. (2006) by allowing both a wider class of preferences and a more general attribute space. Copyright � 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
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Other versions of this item:
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2007. "Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp523, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright & Reinhard Selten, 2005.
"Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0513, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2004.
"Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players,"
Game Theory and Information
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp466, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10.
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- Khan, M. Ali & Yeneng, Sun, 1995. "Pure strategies in games with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 633-653.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
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