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Representation of Finite Action Large Games

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Author Info

  • Rath, Kali P

Abstract

A large game can be formalized as a probability distribution on the set of players' characteristics or as a function from a measure space of players to the set of players' characteristics. Given a game as a probability distribution on the set of players' characteristics, a representation of that game is a function from a set of players to the set of players' characteristics which induces the same distribution. It is shown that if the playoffs are continuous and there are only finite number of actions, then the set of Nash equilibria of any representation of a game induces essentially all the Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions of the given game.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 23-35

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:23-35

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Cited by:
  1. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 9-25, 02.
  2. Carmona, Guilherme, 2008. "Large games with countable characteristics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 344-347, February.
  3. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "A remark on the measurability of large games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 491-494, June.
  4. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.

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