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Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games

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Author Info
Carmona, Guilherme

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Abstract

We consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate prefer- ences. We show that any such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the set of attributes into a bounded number of convex sets with the following property: all players with an attribute in the interior of the same element of the partition play the same action. Furthermore, if the game induces an absolutely continuous distribution (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) on the attribute space, then we can strengthen the conclusion by showing that all players with an attribute in the same element of the partition play the same action.

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Paper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia in its series FEUNL Working Paper Series with number wp523.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp523

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Web page: http://www.fe.unl.pt

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  1. Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," Game Theory and Information 0412009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Rath, Kali P, 1995. "Representation of Finite Action Large Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 23-35.
  3. Wooders, Myrna & Cartwright, Edward & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Behavioral conformity in games with many players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 347-360, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Green, Edward J., 1982. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Working Papers 418, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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