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Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts

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  • Roger Guesnerie

    ()

  • Pedro Jara-Moroni

    ()

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 205-246

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:205-246

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Related research

Keywords: Expectational coordination; Rational expectations; Iterative expectational stability; Eductive stability; Strong rationality; Strategic complementarities; Strategic substitutabilities; D84; C72; C62;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Evans, George, 1985. "Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1217-33, November.
  2. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-45, November.
  3. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  4. Gauthier, S., 1999. "Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria," DELTA Working Papers 1999-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  5. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 2002. "Non-cooperative games with many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 1761-1808 Elsevier.
  6. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "A remark on the measurability of large games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 491-494, June.
  7. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  8. Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
  9. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00587863 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
  11. Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
  12. Gabriel Desgranges & Maik Heinemann, 2004. "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 35, Society for Computational Economics.
  13. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  14. William A. Branch & George W. Evans, 2010. "Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations," CDMA Working Paper Series 201011, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
  15. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  16. Guesnerie, R., 1999. "Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge," DELTA Working Papers 1999-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  17. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2007. "Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order," Economics Papers 2007-W04, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  18. Stéphane Gauthier & Roger Guesnerie, 2005. "Comparing Expectational Stability Criteria in Dynamic Models: A Preparatory Overview," Post-Print hal-00731535, HAL.
  19. Gabriel Desgranges, 2000. "CK-Equilibria and Informational Efficiency in a Competitive Economy," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1296, Econometric Society.
  20. William Branch & Bruce McGough, 2011. "Business cycle amplification with heterogeneous expectations," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 395-421, June.
  21. Azariadis, Costas & Guesnerie, Roger, 1986. "Sunspots and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 725-37, October.
  22. Christophe Chamley, 1999. "Coordinating Regime Switches," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 869-905, August.
  23. Rath, Kali P, 1995. "Representation of Finite Action Large Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 23-35.
  24. Balder, Erik J., 2002. "A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 437-470, February.
  25. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 427-33, July.
  26. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  27. Ghosal, Sayantan, 2006. "Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 11-35, December.
  28. DeCanio, Stephen J, 1979. "Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 47-57, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mordecai Kurz, 2011. "Symposium: on the role of market belief in economic dynamics, an introduction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 189-204, June.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00565011 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Haomiao Yu, 2014. "Rationalizability in large games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 457-479, February.
  4. Mordecai Kurz & Maurizio Motolese, 2007. "Diverse Beliefs and Time Variability of Risk Premia," Discussion Papers 06-044, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  5. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
  6. Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2013. "A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes," Documentos de Trabajo 440, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  7. Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2013. "Asymmetric information and rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 789-804, November.

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