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Coordination on saddle path solutions : the eductive viewpoint. 1 - linear univariate models

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  • Evans, G. E.
  • Guesnerie R.

Abstract

We investigate local strong rationality (LSR) in a one step forward looking univariate model with memory one. Eductive arguments are used to determine when common knowledge (CK) that the solution is near some perfect foresight path is sufficient to trigger complete coordination on that path (i.e. the path is LRS). Coordination of expectations is shown to depend on three factors : the nature of the CK initial beliefs, the degree of structural heterogeneity and the information structure. Our sufficient conditions for LSR precisely reflect these features and provide basic consistent justifications for the choice of the saddle path solution.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 1999-15.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Publication status: Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, February 2003, vol. 7, no. 1
Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:1999-15

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Cited by:
  1. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
  2. George W. Evans & Bruce McGough, 2003. "Monetary Policy, Indeterminacy and Learning," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-34, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Apr 2004.
  3. Haomiao Yu, 2014. "Rationalizability in large games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 457-479, February.
  4. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00587863 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00574957 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Richard Dennis & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2013. "Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking," Working Papers 2013_02, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  7. Richard Dennis & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2010. "Expectations traps and coordination failures: selecting among multiple discretionary equilibria," Working Paper Series 2010-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  8. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586749 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Mordecai Kurz, 2011. "Symposium: on the role of market belief in economic dynamics, an introduction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 189-204, June.
  10. Bai, Yuting & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2013. "Infrequent Fiscal Stabilization," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-17, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

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