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Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players

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  • Pedro Jara-Moroni

    (Departamento de Economía - Universidad de Chile - Universidad de Chile, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

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    Abstract

    The concept of Rationalizability has been used in the last fifteen years to study stability of equilibria on models with continuum of players such as standard competitive markets, macroeconomic dynamics and currency attacks. However, Rationalizability has been formally defined in a general setting only for games with a finite number of players. We propose then a definition for Point-Rationalizable Strategies in the context of Games with a Continuum of Players. In a special class of this games where the payoff of a player depends only on his own strategy and an aggregate value that represents the state of the game, state that is obtained from the actions of all the players, we define the sets of Point-Rationalizable States and Rationalizable States. These sets are characterized and some of their properties are explored. We study as well standard Rationalizability in a subclass of these games.

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    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/58/78/63/PDF/wp200725.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00587863.

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    Date of creation: May 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00587863

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00587863
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    Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

    Related research

    Keywords: rationalizable strategies ; non-atomic games ; expectational coordination ; rational expectations ; eductive stability ; strong rationality;

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    Cited by:
    1. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2007. "Expectational coordination in a class of economic models: Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587837, HAL.
    2. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2009. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts: concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substitutabilities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00574957, HAL.

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